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In this paper we consider symmetric or anonymous $(j,2)$ simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval and the outcome is 'yes' or 'no.' Symmetric $(j,2)$ simple games model some natural decision rules, such as pass-fail grading systems. The most conspicuous case arises for $j = 3$ which serves to model anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote 'yes,' abstain, or vote 'no'.

Each symmetric $(j,2)$ simple game is determined by the set of anonymous minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems for small values of n and j , and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. The first concerns the number of anonymous voting rules with 3 levels of approval. The second exhibit a surprising symmetry certain for anonymous simple games.

In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games, $(2,2)$ simple games in our model, these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry. We consider several real-world examples, suggesting some attractive alternatives supplied by the general theory. (Received September 19, 2007)