1056-91-710   **D. Marc Kilgour*** (`mkilgour@wlu.ca`), Dept of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON N2L 3C5, Canada. *Approval Balloting for Multi-Winner Elections.*

Approval balloting seems a natural approach to multi-winner elections, in that both the ballot and the election result are subsets of the candidates. In this survey of procedures for converting a set of approval ballots to a winning subset, the class of *admissible*, or potentially winning, subsets is considered to be a parameter of the election. Most procedures for multi-winner elections are *scoring* procedures—an admissible subset with the highest score wins—but some are better understood as *threshold* procedures, which select an admissible subset that meets a standard of representativeness as often as possible, or *centralization* procedures, which find an admissible subset that is "central" in the distribution of ballots. The main purpose of this paper is to collect and classify the procedures. Some comparative properties are mentioned, as are the implications of common forms of admissibility for choice of procedure. (Received September 16, 2009)