

1056-M5-444

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We consider something to be real if its properties do not depend on what any collection of people might think of it. Many mathematicians tend to think this way about mathematical objects: as G. H. Hardy puts it, “317 is a prime, not because we think so, or because our minds are shaped in one way rather than another, but because it is so, because mathematical reality is built that way.” To explain their realism, Hardy and others often rely on the language of Platonism. As Alain Connes says, the object of mathematics is “not material, and it is located in neither space nor time,” but nevertheless “has an existence that is every bit as solid as external reality, and mathematicians bump up against it in somewhat the same way as one bumps into a material object in external reality.” Yet Platonism brings with it significant philosophical baggage, to the point that the world of ideas becomes in some way more real than the world of individuals, and knowledge involves peeking into a world of which we have no physical contact. But to be a realist does not necessitate being a Platonist. We can hold both “dogs” and “dog” to be real without a dog becoming a mere shadow. This talk will draw upon the thought of C. S. Peirce to formulate how one may be a realist without being a Platonist. (Received September 07, 2009)