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Irinel C. Dragan* (dragan@uta.edu), 1412 Hyde Park Lane, Arlington, TX 76015. *On the coalitional rationality of the Shapley Value and other efficient values for cooperative transferable utilities games.*

A cooperative transferable utilities game is a pair (N, v) , where N is the set of players and v , called characteristic function, is a function defined on the set of subsets of N , with $v = 0$ for the empty set. The main problem is to divide fairly $v(N)$ among the players taking into account the capabilities of the coalitions expressed by their worth given by the function v . In a previous work of the author (1991), it has been introduced and solved the inverse problem for the Shapley Value. In the present paper, we are looking for finding games in the Inverse Set for which the Shapley Value is coalitional rational. The same problem is solved for the Least Square Values due to Luiz et. al. Some examples are illustrating the technique. (Received September 03, 2013)