Suppose that an award is to be given to one of two candidates by a group of voters from several different departments of an organization. The usual majoritarian model is too simplistic even for this election, because there are recognized subgroups of the electorate whose (joint) opinions may also be deemed relevant. For instance, the majority-losing candidate may receive more votes from all but one department, which votes unanimously for the other candidate. The relevance of this hypothetical situation to the Brexit decision or the US Electoral College should be clear, and is often mentioned in the literature, where it is sometimes known as the ‘referendum paradox’.

In this talk, we investigate the tradeoffs between the different winners (using concepts such as majority deficit) in the simplest cases possible, such as with two candidates or three subgroups. On the one hand, we extend previously known results for quasi-polynomials representing the number of paradoxical outcomes for various impartiality cultures. On the other hand, we also examine a quota-type system which (intentionally) allows numerous ties and give some preliminary results regarding the types and numbers of violations which may occur there. (Received August 21, 2018)