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Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society

The Bulletin publishes expository articles on contemporary mathematical research, written in a way that gives insight to mathematicians who may not be experts in the particular topic. The Bulletin also publishes reviews of selected books in mathematics and short articles in the Mathematical Perspectives section, both by invitation only.

ISSN 1088-9485 (online) ISSN 0273-0979 (print)

The 2020 MCQ for Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society is 0.84.

What is MCQ? The Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) measures journal impact by looking at citations over a five-year period. Subscribers to MathSciNet may click through for more detailed information.

 

The independence of game theory of utility theory
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by Bezalel Peleg PDF
Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 72 (1966), 995-999
References
    1. J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N. J., 1943, 3rd ed., 1953.
  • John Nash, Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. (2) 54 (1951), 286–295. MR 43432, DOI 10.2307/1969529
    • 3. R. J. Aumann, Utility theory without the completeness axiom, Econometrica 30 (1962), 445-462.
  • Bezalel Peleg, Equilibrium points for open acyclic relations, Canadian J. Math. 19 (1967), 366–369. MR 209017, DOI 10.4153/CJM-1967-028-4
    • 5. M. Hausner, Multidimensional utilities, Decision processes, Wiley, New York, 1954, pp. 167-180.
  • R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and decisions: introduction and critical survey, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, N. Y., 1957. A study of the Behavioral Models Project, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University;. MR 0087572
  • R. J. Aumann and B. Peleg, Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to co-operative games without side payments, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 66 (1960), 173–179. MR 120045, DOI 10.1090/S0002-9904-1960-10418-1
    • 8. L. S. Shapley and M. Shubik, The core of an economy with nonconvex preferences, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, R-M=3518-PR, 1963.
  • Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler, The bargaining set for cooperative games, Advances in Game Theory, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N.J., 1964, pp. 443–476. MR 0176842
  • L. S. Shapley, A value for $n$-person games, Contributions to the theory of games, vol. 2, Annals of Mathematics Studies, no. 28, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1953, pp. 307–317. MR 0053477
    • 11. M. Davis and M. Maschler, The kernel of a cooperative game, Econometric Research Program R-M 58, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., 1963. 12. G. Debreu and H. Scarf, A limit theorem on the core of an economy, International Economic Review, 4 (1963), 235-246.
  • Robert J. Aumann, Markets with a continuum of traders, Econometrica 32 (1964), 39–50. MR 172689, DOI 10.2307/1913732
Additional Information
  • Journal: Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 72 (1966), 995-999
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1966-11615-4
  • MathSciNet review: 0215623