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The independence of game theory of utility theory
Author(s):
Bezalel
Peleg
Journal:
Bull. Amer. Math. Soc.
72
(1966),
995-999.
MathSciNet review:
0215623
Retrieve article in:
PDF
References |
Additional information
References:
- 1.
- J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N. J., 1943, 3rd ed., 1953.
- 2.
- J. F. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. 54 (1951), 286-295. MR 43432
- 3.
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- 4.
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- 5.
- M. Hausner, Multidimensional utilities, Decision processes, Wiley, New York, 1954, pp. 167-180.
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- 7.
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- 8.
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- 9.
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- 10.
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- 11.
- M. Davis and M. Maschler, The kernel of a cooperative game, Econometric Research Program R-M 58, Princeton University, Princeton, N. J., 1963.
- 12.
- G. Debreu and H. Scarf, A limit theorem on the core of an economy, International Economic Review, 4 (1963), 235-246.
- 13.
- R. J. Aumann, Markets with a continuum of traders, Econometrica 32 (1964), 39-50. MR 172689
Additional Information:
DOI:
10.1090/S0002-9904-1966-11615-4
PII:
S 0002-9904(1966)11615-4
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