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Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann
Edited by: Myrna H. Wooders, University of Toronto, ON, Canada
A co-publication of the AMS and Fields Institute.

Fields Institute Communications
1999; 291 pp; hardcover
Volume: 23
ISBN-10: 0-8218-0525-8
ISBN-13: 978-0-8218-0525-1
List Price: US$103
Member Price: US$82.40
Order Code: FIC/23
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Since the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the concept of games has played an increasing role in economics. It also plays a role of growing importance in other sciences, including biology, political science, and psychology. Many scientists have made seminal advances and continue to be leaders in the field, including Harsanyi, Shapley, Shubik, and Selten. Professor Robert Aumann, in addition to his important contributions to game theory and economics, made a number of significant contributions to mathematics.

This volume provides a collection of essays in mathematical economics and game theory, including cutting-edge research on noncooperative game theory and its foundations, bargaining theory, and general equilibrium theory. Also included is a reprint of Aumann's classic paper, "Acceptable Points in General Cooperative \(n\)-Person Games" and of the oft-cited, yet hard to find, paper by Maschler, "The Worth of a Cooperative Enterprise to Each Member". This book illustrates the wide range of applications of mathematics to economics, game theory, and social choice.

The volume is dedicated to Professor Robert J. Aumann, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, for his contributions in mathematics and social sciences.

Titles in this series are co-published with the Fields Institute for Research in Mathematical Sciences (Toronto, Ontario, Canada).


Graduate students and research mathematicians interested in economics, game theory, and applications.

Table of Contents

  • R. J. Aumann -- Acceptable points in general cooperative \(n\)-person games
Non-cooperative game theory
  • E. J. Balder -- Young measure techniques for existence of Cournot-Nash-Walras equilibria
  • S. J. Brams -- Modeling free choice in games
Cooperative game theory
  • T. S. H. Driessen -- Pairwise-bargained consistency and game theory: The case of a two-sided firm
  • J. E. Martínez-Legaz -- A new characterization of totally balanced games
  • M. Maschler -- The worth of a cooperative enterprise to each member
  • G. H. McCormick and G. Owen -- Bargaining between heterogeneous organizations
  • R. P. McLean -- Coalition structure values of mixed games
  • L. K. Raut -- Aumann-Shapely random order values of non-atomic games
Economics and social choice
  • B. Allen -- On the existence of core allocations in a large economy with incentive-compatibility constraints
  • B. Chakravorti, J. P. Conley, and B. Taub -- Economic applications of probabilistic cheap talk
  • P. J. Hammond -- Multilaterally strategy-proof mechanisms in random Aumann-Hildenbrand macroeconomies
  • F. H. Page, Jr. and M. H. Wooders -- Arbitrage with price-dependent preferences: Equilibrium and market stability
  • N. Schofield -- A smooth social choice method of preference aggregation
  • M. Shubik and M. H. Wooders -- Clubs, near markets and market games
  • A. H. Turunen-Red and A. D. Woodland -- On economic applications of the Kuhn-Fourier theorem
  • J. Wako -- Coalition-proofness of the competitive allocations in an indivisible goods market
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