Absolutely stable games
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- by Robert James Weber PDF
- Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 55 (1976), 116-118 Request permission
Abstract:
Absolutely stable games, in which every monotone chain of domination reduces to direct domination, are explicitly characterized. Simple games, and $n$-person games in which all minimal-vital coalitions contain at least $n - 1$ players, are seen to satisfy the characterization.References
- John C. Harsanyi, An equilibrium-point interpretation of stable sets and a proposed alternative definition, Management Sci. 20 (1973/74), 1472–1495. MR 363503, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.20.11.1472
Additional Information
- © Copyright 1976 American Mathematical Society
- Journal: Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 55 (1976), 116-118
- MSC: Primary 90D12
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1976-0406545-9
- MathSciNet review: 0406545