Remote Access Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society
Green Open Access

Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society

ISSN 1088-6826(online) ISSN 0002-9939(print)

 
 

 

On the axioms for a cooperative game without side payments


Author: R. E. Stearns
Journal: Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 15 (1964), 82-86
MSC: Primary 90.70
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1964-0158766-2
MathSciNet review: 0158766
Full-text PDF

References | Similar Articles | Additional Information

References [Enhancements On Off] (What's this?)

  • [1] R. J. Aumann and B. Peleg, Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 66 (1960), 173-179. MR 0120045 (22:10802)
  • [2] R. J. Aumann, The core of a cooperative game without side payments, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 98 (1961), 539-552. MR 0127437 (23:B483)
  • [3] B. Peleg, Solutions to cooperative games without side payments, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 106 (1963), 280-292. MR 0143658 (26:1211)
  • [4] R. E. Stearns, Three-person cooperative games without side payments, Annals of Mathematics Studies, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N. J. (to appear). MR 0169704 (29:6949)
  • [5] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of games and economic behavior, 3rd ed., Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N. J., 1953.

Similar Articles

Retrieve articles in Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society with MSC: 90.70

Retrieve articles in all journals with MSC: 90.70


Additional Information

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1964-0158766-2
Article copyright: © Copyright 1964 American Mathematical Society

American Mathematical Society