On the axioms for a cooperative game without side payments
Author:
R. E. Stearns
Journal:
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 15 (1964), 82-86
MSC:
Primary 90.70
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1964-0158766-2
MathSciNet review:
0158766
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References | Similar Articles | Additional Information
- [1] R. J. Aumann and B. Peleg, Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 66 (1960), 173-179. MR 0120045 (22:10802)
- [2] R. J. Aumann, The core of a cooperative game without side payments, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 98 (1961), 539-552. MR 0127437 (23:B483)
- [3] B. Peleg, Solutions to cooperative games without side payments, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 106 (1963), 280-292. MR 0143658 (26:1211)
- [4] R. E. Stearns, Three-person cooperative games without side payments, Annals of Mathematics Studies, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N. J. (to appear). MR 0169704 (29:6949)
- [5] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of games and economic behavior, 3rd ed., Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, N. J., 1953.
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DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1964-0158766-2
Article copyright:
© Copyright 1964
American Mathematical Society