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Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society

ISSN 1088-6826(online) ISSN 0002-9939(print)

 

 

Absolutely stable games


Author: Robert James Weber
Journal: Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 55 (1976), 116-118
MSC: Primary 90D12
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1976-0406545-9
MathSciNet review: 0406545
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Abstract: Absolutely stable games, in which every monotone chain of domination reduces to direct domination, are explicitly characterized. Simple games, and $ n$-person games in which all minimal-vital coalitions contain at least $ n - 1$ players, are seen to satisfy the characterization.


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1976-0406545-9
Keywords: $ n$-person games, von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions
Article copyright: © Copyright 1976 American Mathematical Society