Elsevier

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 33, Issue 2, November 2000, Pages 274-293
Games and Economic Behavior

Regular Article
On the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Random Games

https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0775Get rights and content

Abstract

How many pure Nash equilibria can we expect to have in a finite game chosen at random? Solutions to the above problem have been proposed in some special cases. In this paper we assume independence among the profiles, but we allow either positive or negative dependence among the players' payoffs in a same profile. We provide asymptotic results for the distribution of the number of Nash equilibria when either the number of players or the number of strategies increases. We will show that different dependence assumptions lead to different asymptotic results. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number C72.

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    1

    Supported in part by NSF grant DMS 9803625.

    2

    Supported in part by CNR and MURST.

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