Regular ArticleEfficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games
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Cited by (36)
From equals to despots: The dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
2019, Journal of Economic TheoryJustifiable punishments in repeated games
2014, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :Any efficient, feasible, and strictly individually rational payoff can still be supported by a subgame perfect payoff with justifiable punishments. In a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated games, Bergin and MacLeod (1993) conclude that the conflict between self-enforcement and efficiency is “the problem of renegotiation.” Here, on the contrary, we have the sharp contrast where all the “good” payoffs can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium with justifiable punishments.
Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
2012, Games and Economic BehaviorManagement of a transboundary wildlife population: A self-enforcing cooperative agreement with renegotiation and variable transfer payments
2007, Journal of Environmental Economics and ManagementRenegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
2006, Journal of Economic TheoryRegional versus global cooperation for climate control
2006, Journal of Environmental Economics and ManagementCitation Excerpt :We show below that this is part of the equilibrium behavior. Loosely formulated, an equilibrium is renegotiation-proof if the players as a group cannot find a better alternative [8, p. 43]. More precisely, in order to be a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (in the sense of Farrell and Maskin [19 pp. 330–331]), a strategy profile must satisfy two requirements.8