Regular ArticlePotential Games with Continuous Player Sets
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This paper is based on Chapter 4 of my doctoral dissertation (Sandholm [29]). I thank Josef Hofbauer, an anonymous referee and Associate Editor, and seminar audiences at Caltech, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard (Kennedy), Michigan, Northwestern, Rochester, Washington University, and Wisconsin for their comments. I especially thank Eddie Dekel and Jeroen Swinkels for their advice and encouragement. Financial support from a State Farm Companies Foundation Dissertation Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.
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