Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-XIX

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2. 1 Introduction

   • Eric van Damme

   Pages 1-21

3. 2 Games in Normal Form

   • Eric van Damme

   Pages 22-45

4. 3 Matrix and Bimatrix Games

   • Eric van Damme

   Pages 46-62

5. 4 Control Costs

   • Eric van Damme

   Pages 63-79

6. 5 Incomplete Information

   • Eric van Damme

   Pages 80-100

7. 6 Extensive Form Games

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   Pages 101-129

8. 7 Bargaining and Fair Division

   • Eric van Damme

   Pages 130-165

9. 8 Repeated Games

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   Pages 166-213

10. 9 Evolutionary Game Theory

    • Eric van Damme

    Pages 214-258

11. 10 Strategic Stability and Applications

    • Eric van Damme

    Pages 259-317

12. Back Matter

    Pages 318-339

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I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore [1990] who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating the nine-headed Hydra which grew too heads for each that was struck off. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to thank my secretary, Marjoleine de Wit, who skilfully and, as always, cheerfully typed the manuscript and did the proofreading.

• Nash Equilibrium
• Nash-Gleichgewicht
• Nicht-kooperative Spieltheorie
• Refinements
• Spieltheorie
• game theory

• CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

  Eric Damme

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