Abstract
In this paper an analogue of the bargaining setM i1 is defined for cooperative games without side payments. An existence theorem is proved for games of pairs, while it is shown by an example that no general existence theorem holds.
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References
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Peleg, B. Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments. Israel J. Math. 1, 197–200 (1963). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02759717
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02759717