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Approximations and Well-Posedness in Multicriteria Games

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Abstract

First, sufficient conditions of minimal character are given which guarantee the sequential closedness of the set-valued function defined by the parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria of a parametric multicriteria game, that is to say: a convergent sequence of parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria, corresponding to an approximate value of the parameter x n , converges to a weak-multicriteria Nash equilibrium corresponding to the limit value x of the sequence (x n ) n . Then, approximating sequences and parametrically well-posedness for a multicriteria game are introduced and investigated.

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  1. Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica, Università di Napoli “Federico II”, Via Cintia, 80126, Napoli, Italy

    Jacqueline Morgan

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  1. Jacqueline Morgan
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Correspondence to Jacqueline Morgan.

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Morgan, J. Approximations and Well-Posedness in Multicriteria Games. Ann Oper Res 137, 257–268 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-005-2260-9

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