On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
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We thank Tilman Börgers, Richard Boylan, Vincent Crawford, Eddie Dekel-Tabak, George Mailath (who found an error in our first attempt to prove Proposition 2), Larry Samuelson, Jianbo Zhang, and referees for helpful comments. Cabrales thanks Spain's Ministry of Education and Sobel thanks the NSF for financial support.