Symposium ArticleLearning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game*
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Financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SES-9122176 and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the University of Bonn, is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Drew Fudenberg and Joseph Harrington for helpful discussions, and thank two referees and an associate editor for helpful comments. We are grateful to the Department of Economics at the University of Bonn and the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where part of this work was done, for their hospitality. The authors first encountered the possibility of using the replicator dynamics to obtain unusual results in the Ultimatum Game in a manuscript of James Andreoni and John Miller. This paper was prepared for the Nobel Symposium at Björkborn, Sweden, 18–20 June 1993.