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The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game

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Abstract

A new framework for equilibrium selection is presented. Playing games recurrently inspace and time may render one of the equilibria “spatially dominant”. Prevailing initially ona large enough finite part of the space, it will take over on the whole space in the long run.In particular it will drive out the other equilibria along travelling waves. This new dominanceconcept is compared with the Harsanyi‐Selten risk‐dominance concept.

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  1. J. Hofbauer
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Hofbauer, J. The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game. Annals of Operations Research 89, 233–251 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018979708014

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