Voting Games: Part I

Feature Column Archive

6. References

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Freixas, J., The Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output, Decision Support Systems, 39 (2005)

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(Unsigned) How the European Union Works, European Communities, 2003 (ISBN 92-894-5283-8)

Those who can access JSTOR can find some of the papers mentioned above there. For those with access, the American Mathematical Society's MathSciNet can be used to get additional bibliographic information and reviews of some these materials. Some of the items above can be accessed via the ACM Portal, which also provides bibliographic services.

  1. Introduction
  2. Voting systems and games
  3. Basic mathematical ideas
  4. Unintuitive behavior
  5. More voting games
  6. References