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# Index of Authors

## A

Aarts, H., 248, 352  
Abreu, D., 160  
Ahuja, R., 340  
Algaba, E., 233  
Allais, M., 11  
Alonso-Mejide, J. M., 245, 310  
Amorim, D., 318  
Ancona, M., 239  
Anily, S., 363  
Asheim, G. B., 123  
Aumann, R. J., xi, xiii, 40, 70, 74–77, 81,  
83, 84, 88, 102, 123, 148, 149, 151,  
208, 219, 294, 295, 297, 302  
Axelrod, R., 155

## B

Bachrach, Y., 241  
Bahel, E., 346  
Baker, M. J., 286, 287  
Banzhaf, J. F., 239, 303, 306  
Barro, S., 318  
Battigalli, P., 102, 198  
Baye, M. R., 188  
Bayer, P., 239, 242  
Bazaraa, M. S., 52, 57  
Ben-Porath, E., 123  
Benati, S., 239, 242  
Benjaafar, S., 363  
Benoît, J. P., 157, 159, 297  
Bergantiños, G., 333, 358  
Bernheim, B. D., 86  
Bertrand, J., 96

Binmore, K., 102, 268, 269  
Bird, C. G., 347, 349–351  
Blackwell, D., 125  
Bondareva, O., 223  
Border, K. C., 88  
Borel, E., xii  
Borm, P., 208, 248, 250, 260, 285, 327, 330,  
367  
Borůvka, O., 347  
Brandenburger, A., 84, 88, 202  
Brânzei, R., 292  
Breiman, L., 318  
Brouwer, L., 90

## C

Cai, X., 363  
Calleja, P., 367  
Carreras, F., 260, 263, 264  
Casajus, A., 243  
Casas-Méndez, B., 310, 317, 318, 320  
Castro, J., 236, 239  
Cernadas, E., 318  
Cesco, J. C., 61, 147  
Chae, S., 269  
Chen, Y. C., 200  
Chiu, Y. S., 278  
Cho, I. K., 146  
Chun, Y., 231  
Clark, L., 252  
Cochran, W. G., 237  
Coleman, J., 307  
Cooper, J., 239  
Costa, J., 245, 263, 333, 336

Cournot, A. A., xii, 15, 147  
 Crettez, B., 292  
 Curiel, I., 285, 300, 324, 365, 367

## D

Dalkey, N., 146  
 Dantzig, G. B., 52  
 Dasgupta, A., 278  
 Davenport, W. C., 42  
 Davila-Pena, L., 317, 318, 320  
 de Frutos, M. A., 302  
 de Vries, C. G., 188  
 Deegan, J., 309, 312  
 Dekel, E., 84, 88, 166, 200, 202  
 del Pozo, M., 260  
 Deloche, R., 292  
 Demange, G., 344  
 Deutsch, M., 36  
 Di Tillio, A., 200  
 Driessen, T., 352  
 Dubey, P., 305, 306, 323  
 Dufwenberg, M., 123  
 Dutta, B., 350  
 Dutta, P. K., 160

## E

Ely, J. C., 166, 200  
 Engel, M. C., 322  
 Estévez-Fernández, A., 367  
 Evans, R. A., 278

## F

Faigle, U., 248  
 Faingold, E., 200  
 Farkas, B., 53  
 Felsenthal, D. S., 309  
 Fernández, F. R., 292, 358, 363  
 Fernández-Delgado, M., 318  
 Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G., 292, 310, 330, 358,  
 363, 367  
 Fishburn, P., 11  
 Ford, L. R., 324  
 Fragnelli, V., 233, 292  
 Frank, E., 239  
 French, S., 11  
 Fudenberg, D., 130, 133, 150, 152, 158,  
 166, 189, 193–196, 198, 200  
 Fulkerson, D. R., 324  
 Furth, D., xii

## G

García-Jurado, I., 61, 147, 245, 260, 264,  
 292, 293, 315, 317, 318, 320, 327, 330,  
 333, 336, 358, 363  
 García-Sanz, M. D., 292, 358, 363  
 Gautier, S., 251  
 Gavilán, E. C., 260  
 Gerchak, Y., 363  
 Gillies, D. B., 219, 220  
 Gómez, D., 236, 239, 260  
 Gonçalves-Dosantos, J. C., 245, 333, 336  
 González, P., 292, 358  
 González-Arangüena, E., 260  
 González-Díaz, J., 160, 219, 250, 251, 253,  
 256, 291  
 González-Pimienta, J. C., 153  
 Gossner, O., 150, 159  
 Granot, D., 351  
 Green, J. R., 1, 11, 129, 189  
 Gross, D., 358  
 Gross, M., 239  
 Gul, F., 74, 278

## H

Haller, H., 241  
 Halpern, J. Y., 75  
 Hamers, H., 285, 367  
 Harris, C. M., 358  
 Harsanyi, J., xiii, 70, 71, 73, 165, 192, 200,  
 202  
 Hart, O., 278  
 Hart, S., xi, 40, 208, 231, 278  
 Haviv, M., 363  
 Heiding, H., 208  
 Hendrickx, R., 250, 285  
 Herrero, C., 292, 358  
 Hillas, J., 146  
 Hillier, F., 334  
 Hoeffding, W., 238  
 Holler, M. J., 309, 314  
 Holmes, G., 239  
 Housman, D., 252  
 Howson, J. T., 32  
 Hu, X. F., 245  
 Huberman, G., 351  
 Huettner, F., 243  
 Hurwicz, L., xiii, 189

## I

Ichiishi, T., 88, 254  
 Iñarra, E., 292

**J**

Jansen, M. J. M., 72  
Jarvis, J. J., 52, 57  
Jia, R., 242  
Jia-He, J., 73, 267  
Johnston, R. J., 308, 309  
Jones, M. C., 316

**K**

Kakutani, S., 21, 88, 91  
Kalai, E., 73, 208, 212–214, 227, 323, 324,  
326  
Kandori, M., 149  
Kar, A., 350  
Karczmarz, A., 242  
Karsten, F., 363  
Kern, W., 248  
Khmelnitskaya, A., 263, 308  
Kiss, O., 239, 242  
Klijn, F., 367  
Knaster, B., 90  
Kohlberg, E., 18, 73, 133, 145, 146  
Kononenko, I., 319  
Kopelowitz, A., 248  
Kovenock, D., 188  
Krabbenborg, A., 367  
Krein, M., 47, 92, 94  
Kreps, D. M., 1, 9, 11, 117, 127, 130, 137,  
155, 173, 174, 180  
Krishna, V., 157, 159, 181, 188, 269  
Kruskal, J. B., 347  
Kuhn, H. W., 53, 104, 108  
Kuipers, J., 248  
Kuratowski, C., 90

**L**

Laffont, J. J., 189  
Laruelle, A., 303, 305, 307–309  
Lehrer, E., 241  
Lemke, C. E., 32  
Leonard, H. B., 344  
Li, D. F., 245  
Li, D. L., 260  
Li, J., 363  
Liben-Nowell, D., 239  
Lieberman, G., 334  
Lipani, A., 239  
Lipperts, F., 250  
Litan, C. M., 153  
Littlechild, S. C., 286, 288, 289  
Liu, X., 346  
López-Blázquez, F., 239, 242

Lorenzo-Freire, S., 310

**M**

Machover, M., 309  
Magnanti, R. L., 340  
Mailath, G. J., 126, 146, 149  
Maleki, S., 239  
Mann, I., 236  
Manuel, C., 260  
Markakis, E., 241  
Marron, J. S., 316  
Mas-Colell, A., 1, 11, 129, 189, 231, 278  
Maschler, M., 219, 247–249, 294, 295, 297,  
300, 302  
Maskin, E., xiii, 150, 152, 158, 189  
Maynard Smith, J., 203  
Mazurkiewicz, S., 90  
McKelvey, R. D., 123  
McLean, R. P., 208  
McLennan, A., 88  
Meca, A., 327, 330  
Meessen, R., 260  
Méndez-Naya, L., 61, 147, 315, 317  
Menezes, F. M., 181  
Mertens, J. F., 73, 74, 133, 145, 146, 151,  
202  
Michael, E., 251  
Michalak, T., 242  
Milgrom, P., xiii, 173, 188  
Milman, D., 47, 92, 94  
Mirás Calvo, M. A., 253, 291  
Mitchell, R., 239  
Molina, E., 239  
Monderer, D., 200  
Monteiro, P. K., 181  
Moore, J., 278  
Morchadi, R., 251  
Moretti, S., 233  
Morgenstern, O., xii, 9, 219  
Morris, S., 166, 200  
Mosquera, M. A., 330, 367  
Moulin, H., 276  
Mukherjee, A., 242  
Mutuswami, S., 278  
Myerson, R. B., xiii, 67, 161, 187, 189,  
256–258, 260, 270, 272, 317, 337

**N**

Nash, J., xiii, 18, 27, 30, 165, 208, 209, 211,  
265, 266  
Nilsson, S., 239, 242  
Norde, H., 292

Nowak, A. S., 241, 308  
 Núñez, M., 346

## O

O'Neill, B., 293–295  
 Okada, A., 70  
 Okhrati, R., 239  
 Olszewski, W., 152  
 Oortwijn, S., 208  
 Orlin, J. B., 340  
 Osborne, M., 29, 101, 125, 126, 148  
 Owen, G., 38, 52, 207, 233, 239, 260–263,  
 265, 286, 288, 307, 320  
 Oztireli, C., 239

## P

Packel, E. W., 309, 312  
 Palacios-Huerta, I., 40–42, 122, 123  
 Palfrey, T. R., 123  
 Pareto, V., 209  
 Parthasarathy, T., 32  
 Parzen, E., 315  
 Patrone, F., 233, 292  
 Pearce, D. G., 85, 86, 102  
 Pederzoli, G., 365  
 Peleg, B., 205, 208, 248, 249  
 Pérez-Castrillo, D., 278  
 Peski, M., 166, 200  
 Peters, H., 216  
 Polak, B., 84  
 Potters, J. A. M., 322, 345, 367  
 Prim, R. C., 347  
 Procaccia, A. D., 241  
 Puerto, J., 239, 242, 292, 358, 363

## Q

Quant, M., 248, 250  
 Quinteiro Sandomingo, C., 253, 291

## R

Rafels, C., 346  
 Raghavan, T. E. S., 32, 345  
 Raiffa, H., 213  
 Reijnierse, J. H., 248, 322, 345  
 Reny, P. J., 123  
 Resnick, E., 241  
 Riley, J. G., 187  
 Roberts, J., 173  
 Rosen, J. B., 23  
 Rosenblatt, M., 315  
 Rosenschein, J. S., 241  
 Rosenthal, R., 122, 174  
 Roth, A. E., xiii, 215, 344

Rozemberczki, B., 239, 242  
 Rubinstein, A., 13, 29, 75, 87, 101, 125,  
 126, 147–149, 200, 268, 269

## S

Saavedra-Nieves, A., 242, 367  
 Saberi, A., 241  
 Samet, D., 73, 200, 208, 323  
 Samuelson, L., 126, 146, 149  
 Samuelson, W., 187  
 Sánchez-Rodríguez, E., 219, 250, 251,  
 253, 256, 291, 367  
 Sánchez-Sellero, C., 315, 317  
 Sánchez-Soriano, J., 233  
 Sankowski, P., 242  
 Sarkar, R., 239, 242  
 Scheinhardt, W., 363  
 Schelling, T. C., xiii, 81  
 Schmeidler, D., 219, 245  
 Schouten, J., 367  
 Selten, R., xiii, 61, 101, 105, 106, 110, 117,  
 119, 135, 139, 155, 161, 165, 174  
 Serrano, R., xii, 265, 269, 276, 278  
 Shan, E., 260  
 Shapley, L. S., xiii, 47, 148, 149, 219, 223,  
 228, 229, 233, 236, 248, 249, 253, 254,  
 256, 303, 306, 323, 324, 339  
 Sharp, A., 239  
 Sheather, S. J., 316  
 Sherali, H. D., 52, 57  
 Shortle, J. F., 358  
 Shubik, M., 303, 324, 339  
 Simon, L. K., 61, 67, 147  
 Siniscalchi, M., 102  
 Slikker, M., 363, 367  
 Smale, S., 155  
 Smith, L., 159, 160  
 Smith, W. E., 363  
 Smorodinsky, M., 213, 214  
 Snijders, C., 245  
 Snow, R. N., 47  
 Sobel, J., 146  
 Solymosi, T., 248, 345  
 Sorin, S., 151  
 Sotomayor, M. A. O., 344  
 Sperner, E., 89  
 Ståhl, I., 268  
 Stinchcombe, M. B., 61, 67, 147  
 Straffin, P. D., 36, 42, 103  
 Štrumbelj, E., 319  
 Sudhölter, P., 205, 208  
 Swinkels, J. M., 146

**T**

Tejada, J., 236, 239  
Tersine, R., 327  
Thompson, F. B., 146  
Thompson, G. F., 286, 287  
Thompson, J. M., 358  
Thomson, W., 215, 293, 294, 302  
Tijds, S., 208, 219, 250, 260, 292, 300, 322, 365  
Timmer, J., 327, 363  
Tirole, J., 130, 133, 189, 193–196, 198  
Tourky, R., 88  
Trudeau, C., 346, 358  
Tucker, A. W., 53

**V**

Valencia-Toledo, A., 333  
Valenciano, F., 303, 305, 307–309  
van Damme, E., xii, 61, 64, 72, 140, 143, 145, 146, 266, 268  
van den Brink, R., 231, 243, 260  
van den Nouweland, A., 260, 292, 293, 367  
van Gellekom, J. R. G., 322, 345  
van Houtum, G.-J., 363  
van Velzen, B., 248, 367  
Vázquez-Brage, M., 260, 264, 292, 293  
Vermeulen, A. J., 72  
Vickrey, W., 187, 188  
Vidal-Puga, J. J., 278, 333, 358  
Volij, O., 42, 122, 123  
von Neumann, J., xii, 9, 24, 27, 38, 219, 225  
von Stackelberg, H., 147  
Voorneveld, M., 367

**W**

Wang, T., 242  
Watson, L., 239, 242  
Weber, R. J., 188, 229, 254  
Wen, Q., 160  
Wen-Tsun, W., 73, 267  
Wettstein, D., 278  
Wexler, T., 239  
Whinston, M. D., 1, 11, 129, 189  
Wilson, R., xiii, 117, 127, 130, 137, 155, 173, 174, 180  
Winter, E., 233, 265, 278  
Wolinsky, A., 269  
Woods, K., 239  
Wygocki, P., 242

**X**

Xiong, S., 200

**Y**

Yang, H.-T., 239, 242  
Yang, J. A., 269  
Yanovskaya, E., 263  
Young, H. P., 231, 252, 302  
Yu, Y., 363

**Z**

Zamir, S., 74, 151, 202  
Zang, Z., 346  
Zarzuelo, J. M., 292  
Zemel, E., 227, 323, 324, 326  
Zeng, Y., 363  
Zermelo, E., xii  
Zhang, L., 363  
Zhang, M., 346  
Zhou, L., 253  
Zorn, M., 95

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# Index of Solution Concepts

*Boldface page numbers are used to indicate the pages where the concepts are defined.*

## AIRPORT PROBLEMS AND AIRPORT GAMES

nucleolus, 289  
sequential allocation scheme, 287  
Shapley value, 288

## ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS AND ASSIGNMENT GAMES

core, 341

## BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS AND BANKRUPTCY GAMES

constrained equal awards rule, **296**  
constrained equal losses rule, **296**  
nucleolus, **297**  
proportional rule, **296**  
random arrival rule, **295**  
Shapley value, **297**  
Talmud rule, **296**

## BARGAINING PROBLEMS

Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, **214**  
Nash solution, **211**

## BAYESIAN GAMES, *see* INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMES

## EXTENSIVE GAMES

limit behavior profile induced by a proper equilibrium, **144**

Nash equilibrium, **112**

perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 129

perfect equilibrium, **135**

proper equilibrium, **141**

sequential equilibrium, **131**

subgame perfect equilibrium, **119**

trembling hand perfect equilibrium,

*see* perfect equilibrium

weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, **128**

## INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMES

Bayesian Nash equilibrium, **171**

perfect Bayesian equilibrium, **196**

sequential equilibrium, 175, 196

## INVENTORY PROBLEMS AND INVENTORY GAMES

core, 330

share the ordering cost rule (SOC rule), **330**

## LINEAR PRODUCTION PROBLEMS AND LINEAR PRODUCTION GAMES

core, 321

Owen set, **322**

MAXIMUM FLOW PROBLEMS AND  
MAXIMUM FLOW GAMES

core, 326

MINIMUM COST SPANNING TREE  
PROBLEMS

average Bird rule, 350

Bird rule, 349

core, 351

folk rule, 358

Shapley value, 358

POWER INDICES

Banzhaf index, 307

normalized, 306

"raw", 306

Deegan-Packel index, 312

Johnston index, 310

public good index, 314

Shapley-Shubik index, 304

PROJECT PLANNING

Shapley value, 335

QUEUEING PROBLEMS

core, 360

Shapley value, 360

SEQUENCING PROBLEMS

core, 366

Shapley value, 366

STRATEGIC GAMES

*B*-essential equilibrium, 267

correlated equilibrium, 76

essential equilibrium, 267

Nash equilibrium, 18

optimal strategy, 25

perfect equilibrium, 61

equivalent definitions, 63

proper equilibrium, 67

quasi-strict equilibrium, 71

rationalizable strategy profile, 86

strict equilibrium, 70

strictly perfect equilibrium, 71

strong equilibrium, 70

subjective correlated equilibrium, 77

trembling hand perfect equilibrium,  
*see* perfect equilibrium

undominated Nash equilibrium, 64

core-center, 250

*D*-core, 220

equal division value, 242

equal surplus division value, 242

nucleolus, 247

set of imputations, 219

Shapley value, 229

Weber set, 229

TU-GAMES WITH A PRIORI UNIONS

Owen value, 262

TU-GAMES WITH COMMUNICATION  
GRAPHS

Myerson value, 258

VOTING PROBLEMS, *see* POWER  
INDICES

TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES

Banzhaf value, 239

core, 220

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# Subject Index

*Boldface page numbers are used to indicate the pages where the concepts are defined.*

## Numbers

0-1-normalized TU-game, **225**  
*see also* zero-normalized TU-game

## A

a priori unions, **261**  
airport game, **292**  
quotient game, **261**  
addition of dominated strategies, **67**, **69**  
addition of “irrelevant” actions, **133**, **137**,  
**138**, **142**, **143**  
additive TU-game, **218**  
in maximum flow games, **326**  
in queueing problems, **359**  
additivity, **228**, **230**, **240**, **244**, **263**  
in a priori unions, **262**  
agent strategic game, **138**  
aggregate monotonic allocation rule in a  
TU-game, **251**  
agreeing to disagree, **75**  
airport game, **287**  
a priori unions, **292**  
in queueing problems, **359**  
airport problem, **287**  
algorithm to compute the nucleolus, *see*  
Kopelowitz algorithm  
algorithms for matrix games, **43**  
geometric construction, **43**  
submatrices method, **45**, **50**  
all-pay auction, **188**  
Allais paradox, **11**

allocation  
coalitionally rational, **220**  
efficient, **219**  
feasible, **207**  
imputation, **219**  
in a mechanism design problem, **189**  
in an NTU-game, **207**  
individually rational, **219**  
Pareto efficient, **209**  
allocation rule  
a priori unions, **261**  
communication situation, **257**  
in a bankruptcy problem, *see* division  
rule in a bankruptcy problem  
in a bargaining problem, **209**  
in a TU-game, **228**  
in an NTU-game, **208**  
minimum cost spanning tree problem,  
**349**  
project with delays, **335**  
properties, *see* properties of allocation  
rules  
*see also* Index of Solution Concepts  
allocation scheme in a mechanism  
design problem, **190**  
alternating offers game, **269**  
altruism, **123**  
anonymity, **229**  
in inventory games, **331**  
*see also* symmetric allocation rule in a  
TU-game



- ascending auction, 183  
 aspiration, *see* utopia point  
 assessment, 127  
   consistent, 131  
   consistent vs. reasonable, 197  
   reasonable, 195  
   sequentially rational, 128  
   weakly consistent, 128  
 assignment game, 340  
   totally balanced, 343  
 assignment problem, 340  
 auction, 16  
   ascending, *see* English ascending  
   descending, *see* Dutch descending  
   Dutch descending, 183  
   English ascending, 183  
   first-price, 16, 20, 96  
   incomplete information, 181  
     first-price, 182  
     second-price, 182  
   revenue equivalence principle, 187  
   sealed-bid, 182  
   second-price, 16, 20, 96  
 axiomatic characterizations  
   Banzhaf index, 307  
   Banzhaf value, 240  
   Deegan-Packel index, 312  
   equal division value, 244  
   Johnston index, 311  
   Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, 215  
   Myerson value, 258  
   Nash solution, 211  
   Owen value, 263  
   public good index, 314  
   “raw” Banzhaf index, 307  
   Shapley value, 230  
   Shapley value in a project with delays,  
     338  
   Shapley-Shubik index, 305  
   share the ordering cost rule (SOC  
     rule), 332
- B**
- B*-essential equilibrium, 267  
 backward induction, 120  
   in the centipede game, 122  
   in the repeated chain store game, 155  
   in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma,  
     154  
 backward induction and rationality, 123  
 balanced contributions, 337, 338  
 balanced family, 223  
 balanced TU-game, 223  
   totally balanced, 223  
 balancing coefficients, 223  
 banker game, 207  
 bankruptcy game, 294  
 bankruptcy problem, 294  
 Banzhaf index, 307  
   axiomatic characterization, 307  
   *see also* “raw” Banzhaf index and  
     normalized Banzhaf index  
 Banzhaf total power property, 308  
 Banzhaf total power property in a  
   simple game, 308  
 Banzhaf value, xiii, 239  
   axiomatic characterization, 240  
   computation, 241  
   estimation, 242  
 bargaining problem, 208  
 battle of the sexes game, 33, 76  
 Bayes rule whenever possible, 129, 193,  
   195  
 Bayesian game, 168, 201  
   extensive game representation, 170  
 Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 171  
 Bayesian payoff function, 169  
   first-price auction, 182  
   mechanism, 190  
   second-price auction, 182  
 Bayesian updating, 82, 127, 168  
 behavior strategy, 107  
   Bayesian game, 171  
 behavior vs. mixed strategies, 107–111  
   Kuhn theorem, 110  
 belief mappings, 201  
 beliefs, 73, 127  
   Bayesian updating, 82, 127, 168  
   first order, 199  
   hierarchies, 199  
   second order, 199  
   *see also* system of beliefs  
 Bertrand duopoly, 96  
 best reply, 118, 128  
   extensive game, 112  
   strategic game, 19, 21  
 bimatrix game, 32  
 binary relation, 1  
 binding agreements, 14, 206, 216  
 Bird rule, 349  
   average Bird rule, 350  
 Bondareva–Shapley theorem, 224

Bondareva–Shapley theorem and  
 minimax theorem, 225  
 bounded rationality, 13, 200  
 Brouwer fixed-point theorem, 90

## C

C-mergeability, 311  
 canonical TU-game, 244  
 card game, 104, 114  
 cardinal utility, 10  
   *see also* linear utility  
 centipede game, 101, 122  
 chain store game, 117, 120  
   repeated, 155  
 chain store paradox, 155  
   incomplete information, 173  
 characteristic function of a TU-game, 216  
 characterizations, *see* axiomatic  
   characterizations  
 chicken game, 80  
 choice, 103  
 choice partition, 103  
 claim problem, *see* bankruptcy problem  
 claimant in a bankruptcy problem, 294  
 classification problem, 317  
   influence measure, 318  
   Shapley value, 320  
   TU-game, 319  
 coalition, 205  
 coalitional monotonic allocation rule in a  
   TU-game, 251  
 coalitional rationality, 220  
 common knowledge, 74, 81  
   coordinated attack game, 75  
 common knowledge of rationality, 84,  
   123  
 common prior, 74, 83, 167  
   full support, 172  
 communication situation, 257  
 completely mixed behavior strategy, 131  
 completely mixed strategy, 31  
 component efficiency, 258  
 component efficiency property, 257  
 comprehensive set, 206  
 concave TU-game, 286, 356, 360  
 connected coalition, 256  
 connected component, 257  
 consistency of a division rule, 301  
 consistent assessment, 131  
 consistent assessment vs. reasonable  
   assessment, 197

consistent strategy, *see* *I*-consistent  
 strategy  
 constant-sum game, *see* two-player  
   constant-sum game  
 constrained equal awards rule, 296  
 constrained equal losses rule, 296  
 continuous allocation rule in a TU-game,  
   251  
 convex TU-game, 253, 287, 295, 322, 345,  
   365  
   concave TU-game, 286, 356, 360  
 cooperative operations research games,  
   285  
 coordinated attack game, 75  
 core, 220  
   *D*-core, 220  
   in a linear production game, 321  
   in a maximum flow game, 326  
   in a minimum cost spanning tree  
   game, 351  
   in a queueing problem, 360  
   in a sequencing problem, 366  
   in an assignment game, 341  
   in an inventory problem, 330  
 core allocation, 220  
 core-center, xiii, 250  
 correlated equilibrium, 73, 76  
 correlated strategy profile, 76  
 correspondence, 21  
 cost game, 286  
 cost TU-game  
   concave, 286  
   subadditive, 286  
 Cournot oligopoly, 15, 18  
   *see also* Stackelberg duopoly  
 covariance with positive affine  
   transformations, 210, 211, 215  
 credible threats in repeated games, 157  
 critical player, 309  
 cut in a maximum flow problem, 324  
   minimum cut, 324

## D

*D*-core, 220  
 data science, xiv, 315  
 decision maker, 1  
 decision problem, 2  
 Deegan-Packel index, 312  
   axiomatic characterization, 312  
   mergeable games, 312  
 demand in a bankruptcy problem, 294  
 density estimation problem, 315

Shapley value, 316  
 TU-game, 315  
 descending auction, 183  
 direct mechanism, 190  
 disagreement point, 208  
 discount factor, 150  
 discounted payoffs, 149, **151**  
 divide a million game, **217**, 221, 231, 234, 240  
   *see also* divide-the-dollar game  
 divide-the-dollar game, **270**  
   *see also* divide a million game  
 dividends, *see* Harsanyi dividends  
 division rule in a bankruptcy problem, 293, *see* Index of Solution Concepts, **295**  
 dominated imputation, **220**  
 dominated strategy, **64**  
   addition of, 67, 69  
 DP-mergeability, 312  
 dual linear programming problem, **52**  
 duality theorem, 55, 225  
 dummifying player property in a TU-game, 244, **244**  
 Dutch descending auction, 183  
 dynamic game, *see* extensive game

## E

economic order quantity inventory model, *see* inventory problem  
 efficient allocation, **219**  
   *see also* Pareto efficiency  
 efficient allocation rule in a TU-game, **228**, 230, 263, 305, 332  
   in a priori unions, **261**  
 electronic mail game, 200  
 elimination of strictly dominated strategies, 85  
 English ascending auction, 183  
 epistemic foundations, 81–88, 101, 166  
 equal division value, xiii, 231, **242**  
   axiomatic characterization, 244  
 equal surplus division value, **242**  
 equal treatment of equals, *see* symmetric allocation rule in a TU-game  
 equilibrium concepts, *see* Index of Solution Concepts  
 equilibrium refinements  
   extensive games, 134–146  
   strategic games, 59–73  
 equivalent strategies, **108**

equivalent TU-games, *see* S-equivalent TU-games  
 essential equilibrium, 267  
 estate in a bankruptcy problem, 294  
 excess of a coalition, 245  
 existence results  
   Bayesian games, *see* incomplete information games  
   extensive games  
     Nash equilibrium, 113  
     perfect equilibrium, 140  
     proper equilibrium, 141  
     sequential equilibrium, 132  
     subgame perfect equilibrium, 121  
 incomplete information games  
   Bayesian Nash equilibrium, 172  
   perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 196  
 strategic games  
   correlated equilibrium, 79  
   minimax theorem, 38  
   Nash equilibrium, 23, 30  
   perfect equilibrium, 63  
   proper equilibrium, 68  
   rationalizable strategy profile, 87  
   undominated Nash equilibrium, 66  
   value of a matrix game, *see* minimax theorem  
 expected utility, 10  
   *see also* linear utility  
 extensive game, **102**  
   incomplete information, 192  
   perfect and imperfect information, **105**  
   perfect and imperfect recall, **106**  
 extensive game representation of a Bayesian game, 170

## F

F-scale example, 36  
 fairness, 258  
 fairness property, **257**  
 Farkas lemma, 53  
 feasible allocation, **207**  
 feasible payoff vector in a repeated game, **150**  
 feasible set in a bargaining problem, **208**  
 feasible solution in a linear programming problem, **52**  
 finite strategic game, **28**  
 finite two-player strategic game, 31  
 first order beliefs, 199  
 first-price auction, **16**, 20, 96  
   incomplete information, **182**

fixed-point theorems  
   Brouwer, 90  
   Kakutani, 21, 91  
 flow, *see* maximum flow problem  
 folk rule, 358  
 folk theorems, 156–160  
   finite horizon  
     Nash equilibrium, 156  
     subgame perfect equilibrium, 159  
   infinite horizon  
     Nash equilibrium, 156  
     subgame perfect equilibrium, 158  
 forward induction, 133, 145

## G

game tree, 102  
 glove game, 217, 221, 232, 240, 263, 304  
 grand coalition, 206  
 graph-restricted game, 257

## H

Harsanyi dividends, 234, 284  
 Harsanyi's approach to incomplete  
   information games, 165, 167, 200  
 hawk-dove game, 80  
 hierarchies of beliefs, 199  
 history  
   in a multistage game with incomplete  
     information, 194  
   in a repeated game, 150  
   in the repeated chain store game with  
     incomplete information, 175

## I

*I*-consistent strategy, 76, 81  
 immunity to coalitional manipulation,  
   331, 332  
 impatient players, 151, 269  
   *see also* discounted payoffs  
 imperfect information, 105, 165  
 imperfect recall, 106  
 implementation, 265  
   Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, 276  
   Nash solution  
     Nash's static game, 266  
     Rubinstein's alternating offers  
       game, 268  
   Shapley value, 278  
 imputation, 219  
   dominated or undominated, 220  
 imputations set, *see* set of imputations  
 incomplete information game, 165

  Harsanyi's approach, 165, 167, 200  
   *see also* Bayesian game  
 incomplete information vs. imperfect  
   information, 165  
 incredible threat, 117  
 independence of irrelevant alternatives,  
   210, 211  
 independence of irrelevant delays, 337  
 Index of Authors, 397  
 Index of Solution Concepts, 403  
 individual monotonicity, 214, 215  
 individually rational allocation, 219  
 individually rational payoff vector, 154  
 infinite extensive games  
   stackelberg duopoly, 146  
   *see also* repeated games  
 influence measure, 318  
 information extraction, *see* mechanism  
   design problem  
 information model, 73, 81  
 information partition, 73, 102  
 information set, 103  
 instigation game, 34  
 interdependent valuations, 187  
 inventory game, 330  
 inventory games, 327  
 inventory problem, 328  
   *see also* ordering cost problem  
 iterative elimination of strictly  
   dominated strategies, 85

## J

Johnston index, xiv, 310  
 axiomatic characterization, 311

## K

Kakutani fixed-point theorem, 21, 91  
 Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, 214  
   axiomatic characterization, 215  
   implementation, 276  
 Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz  
   theorem, 90  
 knowledge model, 73  
 Kopelowitz algorithm, 248  
 Krein–Milman theorem, 47, 94  
 Kuhn theorem, 110  
 Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, 53

## L

lexicographic order, 3, 245  
 limit behavior profile induced by a  
   proper equilibrium, 144

linear production game, **321**  
 totally balanced, 321–323  
 linear production games and maximum  
 flow games, 327  
 linear production problem, **320**  
 linear programming game, 323  
 linear programming problem, **52**  
 dual problem, 52  
 feasible solution, 52  
 optimal solution, 52  
*see also* nucleolus and Kopelowitz  
 algorithm  
 linear utility, 6  
 lottery, 9, 29, 107

## M

market, *see* two-sided market  
 market game, 324  
 marketing game, **103**, 114, 115  
 matching, **340**  
 matching pennies game, **20**, 26, 29  
 matrix game, **37**  
 examples, 40–42  
 relevant row or column, 57  
 solve, 43  
 symmetric, 57  
 maximum flow game, **326**  
 additive TU-game, 326  
 totally balanced, 326  
 maximum flow games and linear  
 production games, 327  
 maximum flow problem, **324**  
 maximum game, 227  
 mechanism, **190**  
 direct, 190  
 truthful equilibrium, 190  
 mechanism design problem, 188  
 revelation principle, 191  
 mergeability property in a simple game,  
**310**, **312**, **314**  
 mergeable games, **312**  
 messages in a mechanism design  
 problem, 190  
 minimal winning coalition, **222**  
 quasi-minimal, **309**  
 minimax payoff vector, **150**  
 minimax theorem, 38, 225  
 minimax theorem and  
 Bondareva–Shapley theorem, 225  
 minimum cost spanning tree problem,  
 xiv, **347**  
 pessimistic or private TU-game, **350**

irreducible form, 353  
 totally balanced, 351  
 minimum cut in a maximum flow  
 problem, 324  
 minimum game, 227  
 mixed extension, **30**  
 mixed strategy  
 Bayesian game, **171**  
 extensive game, **107**  
 strategic game, 29, **30**  
 mixed vs. behavior strategies, 107–111  
 Kuhn theorem, 110  
 monotonic allocation rule, *see* individual  
 monotonicity and monotonicity  
 properties in TU-games  
 in a project with delays, **337**  
 monotonic TU-game, **218**  
 zero-monotonic, **219**  
 multilinear extension, **233**  
 multiple object auction, 188  
 Multistage game with incomplete  
 information, 193  
 Myerson value, **258**  
 axiomatic characterization, 258

## N

Nash equilibrium  
 extensive game, **112**  
 repeated game, **152**  
 strategic game, **18**  
 undominated, **64**  
 Nash folk theorem  
 finite horizon, 156  
 infinite horizon, 156  
 Nash program, *see* implementation  
 Nash solution, **211**  
 axiomatic characterization, 211  
 implementation  
 Nash's static game, 266  
 Rubinstein's alternating offers  
 game, 268  
 Nash theorem, 23, 30  
 nature and nature moves, 102  
 network flow, *see* maximum flow  
 problem  
 no advantageous merging or splitting,  
**301**  
 noncooperative implementation, *see*  
 implementation  
 nontransferable utility game, *see*  
 NTU-game  
 normal form game, *see* strategic game

- normalized Banzhaf index, **306**  
*see also* Banzhaf index and “raw”  
 Banzhaf index
- NTU-game, **206**  
 banker game, **207**
- nucleolus, **247**  
 computing via Kopelowitz algorithm,  
 248  
 in a bankruptcy game, **297**  
 in an airport game, **289**
- null player, **228**
- null player property, **228, 230, 240, 305,**  
**307**  
 in a priori unions, **262**  
 in a priory unions, **263**
- nullifying player property in a TU-game,  
**244, 244**
- numéraire good, **216**
- O**
- objective expected utility, **10**  
*see also* linear utility
- one shot deviation principle, **125**
- open auction, **182**
- operations research games, **285**
- operations research models, **285**
- optimal solution in a linear  
 programming problem, **52**
- optimal strategy, **25**
- optimality conditions, *see* Kuhn-Tucker  
 optimality conditions
- ordering cost problem, **330**  
*see also* inventory problem
- ordinal utility, **6**
- Owen set, **322**
- Owen value, **262**  
 airport game with a priori unions, **292**  
 axiomatic characterization, **263**
- ownership function in a maximum flow  
 problem, **325**
- P**
- paradox  
 Allais, **11**  
 chain store, **155**
- Pareto domination, **209**
- Pareto efficiency, **209, 211, 215**  
*see also* efficient allocation
- Parliament of Aragón game, **217, 222,**  
**232, 260, 264, 304, 308, 311, 313, 314**
- path of a strategy in a repeated game,  
**151**
- payoff equivalent strategies, **109**
- payoff function, **13**  
 Bayesian game, **169**  
 extensive game, **103, 107**  
 repeated game, **149, 151**  
 strategic game, **14**  
 mixed extension, **30**  
*see also* utility function
- perfect Bayesian equilibrium, **129, 196**
- perfect Bayesian equilibrium vs.  
 sequential equilibrium, **196**
- perfect equilibrium  
 extensive games, **135**  
 agent strategic game, **138**  
 strategic games, **61**  
 equivalent definitions, **63**
- perfect information, **105**
- perfect monitoring, **149**
- perfect recall, **106**
- PERT, **334**
- PGI-mergeability, **314**
- pivot player in a simple game, **307**
- player partition, **102**
- power index, **217, 303**  
*see also* Index of Solution Concepts
- preference relation, **1, 14, 207**  
 lexicographic, *see* lexicographic order  
 representable, **3**
- Prim’s algorithm, **347**
- prior belief, **73**  
 common prior, **74**
- prisoner’s dilemma game, **14, 18**  
 repeated, **154**
- production process, *see* linear  
 production problem
- project, **333**  
 PERT, **334**  
 with delays, **335**
- project planning, **xiv**
- proper equilibrium  
 extensive games, **141**  
 limit behavior profile, **144**  
 strategic games, **67**
- properties of allocation rules  
 in a bankruptcy problem (division  
 rules)  
 consistency, **301**  
 no advantageous merging or  
 splitting, **301**  
 in a bargaining problem

- covariance with positive affine transformations, **210**, 211, 215
  - independence of irrelevant alternatives, **210**, 211
  - individual monotonicity, **214**, 215
  - Pareto efficiency, **209**, 211, 215
  - symmetry, **209**, 211, 215
  - in a communication situation
    - component efficiency, **257**, 258
    - fairness, **257**, 258
    - stability, **257**, 259
  - in a priori unions
    - additivity, 262
    - efficiency, **261**
    - null player, **262**
    - symmetry among unions, **262**, **263**
    - symmetry within unions, **262**, 263
  - in a project with delays
    - balanced contributions, **337**, 338
    - independence of irrelevant delays, **337**
    - monotonicity, **337**
    - scale invariance, **337**
  - in a simple game
    - Banzhaf total power property, 308
    - transfer, **305**, 307
  - in a TU-game
    - additivity, **228**, 230, 240, 244, 263
    - aggregate monotonicity, **251**
    - coalitional monotonicity, **251**
    - continuity, 251
    - dummifying player, 244, **244**
    - efficiency, **228**, 230, 263, 305, 332
    - null player property, **228**, 230, 240, 263, 305, 307
    - nullifying player, 244, **244**
    - strong monotonicity, **251**
    - symmetry, **228**, 230, 240, 244, 305, 307
    - weak coalitional monotonicity, **251**
  - in an inventory game
    - immunity to coalitional manipulation, **331**, 332
  - properties of power indices
    - in a simple game
      - C-mergeability, **310**
      - DP-mergeability, **312**
      - efficiency, 311, 312, 314
      - mergeability, 311, 312, 314
      - null player property, 311, 312, 314
      - PGI-mergeability, **314**
      - symmetry, 311, 312, 314
      - proportional rule, **296**
    - public good index, xiv, **314**
      - axiomatic characterization, 314
    - public randomization, 149, 152
    - punishments in repeated games, 157
    - pure best reply, **31**
    - pure strategy
      - Bayesian game, **169**
      - extensive game, **107**
      - strategic game, **14**, 29
- Q**
- quasi-minimal winning coalition, **309**
  - quasi-strict equilibrium, 71
  - queueing game, **359**
  - queueing problem, xiv, *see* queueing system
  - queueing system, 358
  - quotient game, **261**
- R**
- random arrival rule, **295**
  - rationality, 13, **83**
    - bounded, 13, 200
  - rationality and backward induction, 123
  - rationalizability, 86
  - rationalizable strategy, **86**
  - “raw” Banzhaf index, **306**
    - axiomatic characterization, 307
    - see also* Banzhaf index and normalized Banzhaf index
  - realization equivalent strategies, **109**
  - reasonable assessment, **195**
  - reasonable assessment vs. consistent assessment, 197
  - refinements, *see* equilibrium refinements
  - repeated chain store game, **155**
    - incomplete information, 173
  - repeated game, **150**
    - folk theorems, 156–160
  - repeated prisoner’s dilemma, **154**
    - incomplete information, 173
  - reputation, 156, 176
  - reservation payoff in a mechanism design problem, 189
  - revelation principle, 191
  - revenue equivalence principle, 187
  - reward in repeated games, 158
  - rock, paper, scissors game, 96
  - Rubinstein’s alternating offers game, **269**

## S

- S-equivalent TU-games, **225**
- scale invariance, **337**
  - see also* covariance with positive affine transformations
- sealed-bid auction, **182**
- second order beliefs, **199**
- second-price auction, **16, 20, 96**
  - incomplete information, **182**
- Security Council voting game, **304, 308, 311, 313**
- self-enforcing strategy profile, **60**
- separating hyperplane theorem, **94**
- separation theorems, **92–94**
- sequencing problem, *xiv*, *see* sequencing situation
- sequencing situation, **363**
- sequential allocation scheme in airport problems, **287**
  - see also* Shapley value in airport problems
- sequential equilibrium, **131, 175**
  - repeated game, **153**
- sequential equilibrium vs. perfect Bayesian equilibrium, **196**
- sequential rationality, **128**
- set of imputations, **219**
- Shapley value, **229**
  - as a power index, *see* Shapley-Shubik index
  - axiomatic characterization, **230**
  - computation, **233**
  - estimation, **236**
  - implementation, **278**
  - in a bankruptcy game, **297**
  - in a classification problem, **320**
  - in a density estimation problem, **316**
  - in a minimum cost spanning tree problem, **354, 358**
  - in a project with delays, **335**
    - axiomatic characterization, **338**
  - in a sequencing problem, **366**
  - in an airport game, **288**
- Shapley-Shubik index, **304**
  - axiomatic characterization, **305**
- share the ordering cost rule (SOC rule), **330**
  - axiomatic characterization, **332**
- simple game, **221, 303**
  - power index, **309**
  - weighted majority, **303**
    - see also* power indices and voting problems
- solution concepts, *see* Index of Solution Concepts
- solve a matrix game, **43**
- Sperner labelling, **89**
- Sperner lemma, **89**
- stability property, **257, 259**
- Stackelberg duopoly, **147**
- stage game, **149, 150**
- state of the world, **73, 81, 166, 168**
- static game, *see* strategic game
- strategic game, **13, 14**
  - associated with an extensive game, **107**
  - incomplete information, *see* Bayesian game
  - mixed extension, **30**
- strategy
  - assessment, **127**
  - behavior, **107**
    - Bayesian game, **171**
    - completely mixed, **31**
    - completely mixed behavior strategy, **131**
  - correlated profile, **76**
  - dominated, **64**
    - addition of, **67, 69**
  - equivalent, **108**
  - I*-consistent, **76, 81**
  - mixed, **30**
    - Bayesian game, **171**
    - extensive game, **107**
    - strategic game, **29**
    - support, **31**
  - optimal, **25**
  - payoff equivalent, **109**
  - pure
    - Bayesian game, **169**
    - extensive game, **107**
    - strategic game, **14, 29**
  - rationalizable, **86**
  - realization equivalent, **109**
  - repeated game, **151**
  - strictly dominated, **84**
  - undominated, **64**
- strict equilibrium, **70**
- strictly determined game, **25**
- strictly dominated strategy, **84**
- strictly perfect equilibrium, **71**
- strong equilibrium, **70**



strongly monotonic allocation rule in a TU-game, **251**  
 subadditive TU-game, **286**  
 subconvex TU-game, **345**  
 subgame, **119**  
 subgame perfect equilibrium, **119**  
   repeated game, **152**  
 subgame perfect folk theorem  
   finite horizon, **159**  
   infinite horizon, **158**  
 subjective correlated equilibrium, **77**  
 submatrices method, **45, 50**  
 superadditive, **287**  
 superadditive TU-game, **218**  
   subadditive, **286**  
   weakly, **218**  
 support of a mixed strategy, **31**  
 support property in a TU-game, **230, 305**  
 supporting hyperplane theorem, **93**  
 swing in a simple game, **306**  
 symmetric allocation rule in a  
   bargaining problem, **209, 211, 215**  
 symmetric allocation rule in a TU-game,  
   **228, 230, 240, 244, 263, 305, 307**  
 symmetric matrix game, **57**  
 symmetry among unions, **262, 263**  
 symmetry within unions, **262, 263**  
 system of beliefs, **127**

## T

Talmud bankruptcy problems, **294, 297**  
 Talmud rule, **296**  
 totally balanced, **223**  
   in linear production games, **321–323**  
   in maximum flow games, **326, 343**  
   in minimum cost spanning tree  
   games, **351**  
 transfer property in a simple game, **305, 307**  
 transferable utility game, *see* TU-game  
 tree, *see* game tree  
 tremble  
   extensive games, **135**  
   strategic games, **61**  
 trembling hand perfect equilibrium, *see*  
   perfect equilibrium  
 trigger strategy, **157**  
 truncated demands, **301**  
 truthful equilibrium, **190**  
 TU-game, **216**  
   0-1-normalized game, **225**  
   a priori unions, **xiii, 261**

additive, **218**  
 balanced, **223**  
 canonical, **244**  
 communication situation, **xiii, 257**  
 concave, **286**  
 convex, **253**  
 cost game, **286**  
 graph-restricted game, **257**  
 monotonic, **218**  
 multilinear extension, **233**  
 quotient game, **261**  
 simple, **221, 303**  
   weighted majority, **303**  
 subadditive, **286**  
 subconvex, **345**  
 superadditive, **218**  
 totally balanced, **223**  
 weakly superadditive, **218**  
 zero-monotonic, **219**  
 zero-normalized, **218**  
 two-player constant-sum game, **28**  
 two-player zero-sum game, **24**  
   *see also* matrix game  
 two-sided market, **339**  
   matching, **340**  
 type, **167, 168, 201**  
 type-space, **167, 201**

## U

ultimatum game, **270**  
 unanimity game, **230, 230**  
 undirected graph  
   connected coalition, **256**  
   connected component, **257**  
 undiscounted payoffs, **151**  
 undominated imputation, **220**  
 undominated Nash equilibrium, **64**  
 undominated strategy, **64**  
 unilateral deviation, **18**  
 United Nations Security Council voting  
   game, **304, 308, 311, 313**  
 updating, *see* Bayesian updating  
 utility function, **3, 103**  
   *see also* payoff function and von  
   Neumann and Morgenstern  
   utility function  
 utopia point, **214**

## V

value of a zero-sum game, **25**  
 vector of marginal contributions, **229**  
 veto player, **222**

visiting professor game, **217**, 222, 232,  
240, 254  
von Neumann and Morgenstern utility  
function, **9**, 30, 103, 107, 168, 209  
*see also* linear utility  
voting game, 304  
*see also* simple game  
voting problem, 303

## W

war of attrition, 203  
weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, **128**  
weakly coalitional monotonic allocation  
rule in a TU-game, **251**  
weakly consistent assessment, **128**  
weakly superadditive TU-game, **218**  
*see also* superadditive TU-game  
Weber set, 229  
weighted majority game, 303  
winning coalition, **222**  
minimal, **222**  
quasi-minimal, **309**  
worth of a coalition, 216

## Z

zero-monotonic TU-game, **219**  
zero-normalized TU-game, **218**, 242  
*see also* 0-1-normalized TU-game  
zero-sum game, *see* two-player zero-sum  
game

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