

Contents

Preface	ix
Acknowledgments	xiii
Chapter 1. What's So Good About Majority Rule?	1
The Mayor of Stickeyville	1
Anonymity, Neutrality, and Monotonicity	3
Majority Rule and May's Theorem	5
Quota Systems	6
Back to May's Theorem	8
Questions for Further Study	10
Answers to Starred Questions	12
Chapter 2. Le Pen, Nader, and Other Inconveniences	15
The Plurality Method	17
The Borda Count	18
Preference Orders	20
Back to Borda	22
May's Theorem Revisited	23
Questions for Further Study	25
Answers to Starred Questions	30
Chapter 3. Back into the Ring	33
Condorcet Winners and Losers	35
Sequential Pairwise Voting	38
Instant Runoff	42
Putting It All Together	45
Questions for Further Study	46
Answers to Starred Questions	49
Chapter 4. Trouble in Democracy	53
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives	54
Arrow's Theorem	58

Pareto's Unanimity Condition	63
Concluding Remarks	65
Questions for Further Study	65
Answers to Starred Questions	68
Chapter 5. Explaining the Impossible	71
Proving Arrow's Theorem	72
Potential Solutions	79
Concluding Remarks	85
Questions for Further Study	86
Answers to Starred Questions	88
Chapter 6. Gaming the System	91
Strategic Voting	92
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem	93
Proving the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem	95
Concluding Remarks	101
Questions for Further Study	102
Answers to Starred Questions	103
Chapter 7. One Person, One Vote?	105
Weighted Voting Systems	106
Dictators, Dummies, and Veto Power	109
Swap Robustness	110
Trade Robustness	113
Questions for Further Study	115
Answers to Starred Questions	118
Chapter 8. Calculating Corruption	121
The Banzhaf Power Index	122
The Shapley-Shubik Power Index	125
Banzhaf Power in Psykozia	128
A Splash of Combinatorics	130
Shapley-Shubik Power in Psykozia	133
Questions for Further Study	135
Answers to Starred Questions	138
Chapter 9. The Ultimate College Experience	143
The Electoral College	144
The Winner-Take-All Rule	146
Some History	148
Power in the Electoral College	149
Swing Votes and Perverse Outcomes	153
Alternatives to the Electoral College	157
Questions for Further Study	158
Answers to Starred Questions	162

Chapter 10. Trouble in Direct Democracy	163
Even More Trouble	165
The Separability Problem	166
Binary Preference Matrices	168
Testing for Separability	169
Some Potential Solutions	173
Questions for Further Study	179
Answers to Starred Questions	182
Chapter 11. Proportional (Mis)representation	185
The U.S. House of Representatives	186
Hamilton's Apportionment Method	187
Jefferson's Apportionment Method	190
Webster's Apportionment Method	195
Three Apportionment Paradoxes	196
Hill's Apportionment Method	198
Another Impossibility Theorem	200
Concluding Remarks	201
Questions for Further Study	202
Answers to Starred Questions	205
Chapter 12. Choosing Your Voters	207
Gerrymandering	209
Rules for Redistricting	214
Geometry and Compactness	215
Partisan Symmetry	218
The Efficiency Gap	221
Concluding Remarks	223
Questions for Further Study	224
Answers to Starred Questions	227
Bibliography	229
Index	233