The core of a cooperative game without side payments
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- by Robert J. Aumann
- Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 98 (1961), 539-552
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1961-0127437-2
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References
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Bibliographic Information
- © Copyright 1961 American Mathematical Society
- Journal: Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 98 (1961), 539-552
- MSC: Primary 90.70
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1961-0127437-2
- MathSciNet review: 0127437