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Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory: Essays in Honor of Robert J. Aumann
About this Title
Myrna H. Wooders, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada, Editor
Publication: Fields Institute Communications
Publication Year:
1999; Volume 23
ISBNs: 978-0-8218-0525-1 (print); 978-1-4704-3047-4 (online)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1090/fic/023
MathSciNet review: MR1726553
MSC: Primary 91-06; Secondary 00B30
ReadershipTable of Contents
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Front/Back Matter
Chapters
- Robert Aumann – Acceptable points in general cooperative $n$-person games
Non-cooperative game theory
- Erik Balder – Young measure techniques for existence of Cournot-Nash-Walras equilibria
- Steven Brams – Modeling free choice in games
Cooperative game theory
- Theo Driessen – Pairwise-bargained consistency and game theory: The case of a two-sided firm
- Juan Martínez-Legaz – A new characterization of totally balanced games
- Michael Maschler – The worth of a cooperative enterprise to each member
- Gordon McCormick and Guillermo Owen – Bargaining between heterogeneous organizations
- Richard McLean – Coalition structure values of mixed games
- Lakshmi Raut – Aumann-Shapely random order values of non-atomic games
Economics and social choice
- Beth Allen – On the existence of core allocations in a large economy with incentive-compatibility constraints
- Bhaskar Chakravorti, John Conley and Bart Taub – Economic applications of probabilistic cheap talk
- Peter Hammond – Multilaterally strategy-proof mechanisms in random Aumann-Hildenbrand macroeconomies
- Frank Page, Jr. and Myrna Wooders – Arbitrage with price-dependent preferences: Equilibrium and market stability
- Norman Schofield – A smooth social choice method of preference aggregation
- Martin Shubik and Myrna Wooders – Clubs, near markets and market games
- Arja Turunen-Red and Alan Woodland – On economic applications of the Kuhn-Fourier theorem
- Jun Wako – Coalition-proofness of the competitive allocations in an indivisible goods market